The Tito–Stalin Split : a reassessment in light of new evidence by Perovic, Jeronim
The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New 
Evidence 
Jeronim Perović
Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 9, Number 2, Spring 2007, pp. 32-63
(Article)
Published by The MIT Press
For additional information about this article
Access provided at 24 Jan 2020 13:02 GMT from University of Basel
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/214754
32
The Tito-Stalin SplitPerovib
The Tito-Stalin Split
A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence
✣ Jeronim Perovi
Introduction
On 29 June 1948 the world learned with astonishment about the ªrst schism
within the Communist bloc. The Soviet press that day published a resolution
titled “The Situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party” that had been
adopted a few days earlier at a meeting in Romania of the Communist Infor-
mation Bureau (Cominform). The resolution accused the Communist leaders
in Belgrade of “having recently pursued in domestic and foreign affairs poli-
cies that fundamentally deviate from the Marxist-Leninist line” and “thereby
placed themselves and Yugoslavia outside the family of fellow Communist
parties, outside the united Communist front, and consequently outside the
Cominform.”1
This event was all the more surprising because Yugoslavia was generally
considered Moscow’s most loyal ally among the newly established “people’s
democracies” in Eastern Europe. The Yugoslav Communists were well-known
for having pursued the establishment of socialism in their country more ag-
gressively than their comrades elsewhere in the socialist camp. The Soviet
Union seemed to have a strong interest in maintaining good relations with
Yugoslavia. The Soviet leader, Josif Stalin, counted on Yugoslavia as a reliable
ally that served as a model for the other people’s democracies in their internal
development.
Well before the archives of the former Communist bloc became accessi-
ble, the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict of 1948 had been extensively discussed in
Western Cold War historiography.2 In 1983 a prominent German historian of
1. The resolution published in Pravda on 29 June 1948 can be found in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds.,
The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994), pp. 610–
621.
2. A review of the publications which appeared in the West on the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict of 1948
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the Cold War, Jens Hacker, went so far as to claim that the background and
causes of the rift between Stalin and Josip Broz Tito “have, thanks to authen-
tic Yugoslav sources, long since been largely illuminated and explained.”3 The
release of primary documents by the Belgrade authorities after the break in
1948, including the correspondence between Stalin and Tito in the spring of
1948,4 and the great number of Yugoslav publications about the conºict
(many of them memoirs by high-ranking participants in the conºict such as
Tito, Milovan Djilas, and Edvard Kardelj5) provided historians with a rich—
albeit one-sided—base of information.6
This article reconsiders the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948 based on newly
available documents from two Moscow archives: the Foreign Policy Archive
of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) and the former Central Party Archive,
now known as the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI).
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will be found in the bibliographies of Francine Friedman, ed., Yugoslavia: A Comprehensive English-
Language Bibliography (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993), pp. 351–359; and John J.
Horton, ed., Yugoslavia (Oxford, UK, and Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Press, 1990), pp. 45–48.
3. Jens Hacker, Der Ostblock: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Struktur 1939–1980 (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1983), p. 392.
4. The English version was published in 1948. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Soviet-
Yugoslav Dispute: Text of the Published Correspondence (London: RIIA, 1948). An extended and anno-
tated Russian version was published in serial form in L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Sekretnaya sovetsko-
yugoslavskaya perepiska 1948” [Part 1], Voprosy istorii (Moscow), No. 4–5 (1992), pp. 119–136; L.
Ya. Gibianskii, “Sekretnaya sovetsko-yugoslavskaya perepiska 1948” [Part 2], Voprosy istorii (Moscow),
No. 6–7 (1992), pp. 158–172; and L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Sekretnaya sovetsko-yugoslavskaya perepiska
1948” [Part 3], Voprosy istorii (Moscow), No. 10 (1992), pp. 141–160.
5. For an overview, see Lucien Karchmar, “The Tito-Stalin Split in Soviet and Yugoslav Historiogra-
phy,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Per-
spective (New York: Social Science Monographs, 1982), pp. 253–271.
6. Soviet historiography treated the conºict with Yugoslavia in a polemical or propagandistic way, es-
pecially in 1948–1953 when Stalin presided over a ªerce anti-Tito campaign. An exception was the
short period from 1955 to 1960, when the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev brought up the issue in
his de-Stalinization campaign. During a visit to Belgrade in May 1955, for instance, Khrushchev ar-
gued that the earlier Soviet indictment of Yugoslavia was a “fabrication by enemies of the people” and
that Stalin was solely responsible for the conºict. “Khrushchev’s Speech at Belgrade Airport, 26 May
1955,” in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Key Soviet-Yugoslav Documents: A Reference Aid (Washing-
ton, DC: National Foreign Assessment Center, 1980), pp. 9–10. No other worthwhile Soviet source
was available until the full reconciliation between the two countries following Mikhail Gorbachev’s
visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988. After the visit, the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies within
the Soviet Academy of Science organized a roundtable with prominent scholars from both countries to
discuss the conºict of 1948. See “Sovetsko-yugoslavskiy konºikt 1948–1953 gg.: Prichiny, razvitie,
posledstviya i uroki (‘Kruglyi stol’),” Rabochyi klass i sovremennyi mir (Moscow), No. 3 (1989),
pp. 98–121. Articles on the topic before the roundtable also appeared in the Soviet journals Voprosy
istorii (No. 7, 1988) and Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (No. 4, 1988). Some previously unpublished cor-
respondence between Moscow and Belgrade was made public in Vestnik MID SSSR, No. 6 (1990),
pp. 53–63. The ªrst monograph based on new archival documents is Yuri S. Girenko, Stalin-Tito
(Moscow: Politizdat, 1991). Although Girenko was granted access to materials from the archive of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry, his book unfortunately lacks any reference to the exact location of these
sources. The foremost expert on the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the conºict of 1948 is
Leonid Gibianskii, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies under the
Russian Academy of Science. Over the past two decades, Gibianskii has published many articles on the
subject.
The article discusses aspects of the conºict that were frequently mentioned in
earlier Yugoslav writings—the role of ideology, the nature of Soviet policy in
Eastern Europe, and the impact of Yugoslav’s policy toward its Balkan neigh-
bors—and assesses their relevance in light of the new evidence from Russian
archives.
Although all of these elements are relevant for understanding the conºict,
some are more important than others. In particular, the version propagated in
the ofªcial Yugoslav historiography under Tito needs to be reassessed. Accord-
ing to the Yugoslav literature, the break with Moscow arose because Yugosla-
via was pursuing a separate path toward socialism that could not be reconciled
with the hegemonic Soviet concept of the hierarchical organization of the so-
cialist bloc.7 The Tito-era accounts suggest that Yugoslavia had been pursuing
its own course toward socialism from the ªrst days of the partisan resistance in
1941, not just since 1948. To varying degrees, this version has been accepted
by many Western scholars writing about the Tito-Stalin split.8
The notion that the conºict stemmed from the resistance of Yugoslav
leaders to Soviet hegemony is correct insofar as Stalin’s increasing ambition to
control the socialist camp after World War II was bound to provoke tension
between Moscow and individual states. From Soviet documents, however, it is
not apparent that the roots of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute derive from differ-
ing ideological views concerning the development of socialism. Nor do the
sources contain any indication that the basically harmonious relationship be-
tween Moscow and Belgrade was seriously at risk at any time before the end of
1947.
Instead, the documents indicate that the main reason for the conºict was
Stalin’s dismay when Tito continued to pursue an expansionist foreign policy
agenda toward Yugoslavia’s neighbors, especially Albania, against Moscow’s
stern advice at a time when Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole
was hardening.9 Soviet and Yugoslav interests collided once it became clear in
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7. From the 1950s through the late 1980s, Western scholarly perceptions of the Soviet-Yugoslav split
were heavily inºuenced by the publications of the Yugoslav historian Vladimir Dedijer, who had been
a senior ofªcial until the mid-1950s. See, for example: Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za
biograªju (Zagreb: Kultura, 1953). On the 1948 split, Dedijer’s Izgubljena bitka J. V. Staljina
(Belgrade: Prosveta, 1969), which was later published in English translation, has been particularly
inºuential.
8. See the following two Western publications, which were published just before the archives in East-
ern Europe and Russia became accessible: Bruno Heidlberger, Jugoslawiens Auseinandersetzung mit dem
Stalinismus: Historische Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen (Bern: Peter Lang Verlag, 1989); and Pierre
Maurer, “The Tito-Stalin Split in Historical Perspective,” Bradford Studies on Yugoslavia No. 11,
Postgraduate School of Yugoslav Studies, University of Bradford, 1987.
9. Stalin’s rejection of the Marshall plan was a major turning point in Soviet-Western relations and ac-
celerated the process of Soviet-led bloc-building in Eastern Europe. See Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail
M. Narinsky, “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports,”
Working Paper No. 9, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, March 1994; and
February–March 1948 that Tito would not abandon his goals in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia’s status as the ªrst victim of Moscow’s policy of Gleichschaltung in
the socialist camp cannot be ascribed to a long-term Soviet plan or a particu-
lar animosity on Stalin’s part toward the Belgrade leaders. Rather Tito’s policy
in the Balkans provided an opportunity to clamp down on Yugoslavia and
thereby tighten Soviet control over the whole socialist camp.
The ªrst two sections of this article discuss the role of ideology and Soviet
foreign policy in the Tito-Stalin split. The third and fourth sections look at
Yugoslavia’s ambitions in the Balkans and the implications for Soviet-Yugoslav
relations. From Yugoslav sources, especially Milovan Djilas’s famous Conver-
sations with Stalin,10 historians have long known about the relevance of Tito’s
Balkan policy for the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict, but the Soviet documents pro-
vide many intriguing new details about this topic. The ªfth section describes
the events leading up to the open confrontations, particularly the important
Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting of 10 February 1948. The ªnal section ex-
plains the motivation for Tito’s deªance of Stalin after the conºict came to a
head in the spring of 1948 and shows how the Soviet-Yugoslav rift ªts into the
wider pattern of Moscow’s bloc-building in Eastern Europe.
The Role of Ideology: The Claim of Yugoslavia’s Own
Path to Socialism
Because the leaders of all Soviet-bloc countries claimed their legitimacy from
ideology, conºicts among them were essentially ideological or had to be pre-
sented as such. The Cominform resolution of 28 June 1948 accused the
Yugoslavs of deviating from the Marxist-Leninist line. The published letters
exchanged by Soviet and Yugoslav leaders from March through May 1948—
letters that were merely a prelude to the Cominform resolution in June—were
entirely ideological in tone. The Soviet letters attacked the Yugoslav system
and accused Yugoslav leaders of going their own way in the building of social-
ism rather than adhering to the Soviet model.
In response, the Yugoslavs insisted that they were not in any way deviat-
ing from the Marxist-Leninist line. Not until later, when Tito sought to bol-
ster domestic support for his leadership and to give the Yugoslav model a new
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M. M. Narinskij, “SSSR i plan Marshalla: Po materialam Arkhiva Prezidenta RF,” Novaya i noveishaya
istoriya (Moscow), No. 2 (1993), pp. 11–19.
10. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962). Djilas was
originally one of Tito’s closest conªdants. He was excluded from the party in 1954 for remarks critical
of the regime and later served a seven-year prison sentence. Djilas subsequently gained wide attention
for another book, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York and Washington:
Praeger, 1968). He died in 1995.
ideological justiªcation, did he embrace the argument that the split occurred
because of Yugoslavia’s own path toward socialism. When Tito spoke with
his biographer in the summer of 1952, he put forth the new line: “When did
the dispute between our country and the Soviet leadership really start? If we
consider the historical course of events, it is clear that by 1941, from the very
start of our revolution, elements of frictions between us and them already
existed.”11
It is true that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were never entirely smooth. Even
during World War II, disagreements emerged between the two sides, most
notably when Tito established a provisional government in Jajce on 29–30
November 1943, apparently against Stalin’s will.12 New frictions arose after
the war because of Yugoslavia’s policies toward its neighbors. In particular
Belgrade’s territorial claims on Italy’s Trieste region brought Yugoslavia to the
brink of war with Allied troops in early 1945 and were a frequent point of
contention between Tito and Stalin, who was careful not to antagonize the
Soviet Union’s wartime allies.13 Tito also embarked on a series of international
initiatives without ªrst consulting Stalin. A prominent example was Tito’s sig-
nature of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance
on 1 August 1947 without prior notiªcation to Moscow.14
Nonetheless, Tito’s domestic and foreign policies did not seriously impair
the extremely close bilateral relations that existed until only a few months be-
fore the open split. Tito waged war against the German occupying troops
largely under the banner of Soviet-style Communism and Marxist-Leninist
ideology.15 Perhaps Stalin did not approve of Tito’s decision to form a govern-
ment in November 1943 for fear of straining relations with the United States
and Great Britain (although there is no clear archival evidence to sustain this
interpretation), but all evidence suggests that Tito dutifully kept Soviet lead-
ers informed about his intentions before the decision at Jajce was taken.16
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11. Cited in Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, Vol. 1, p. 405.
12. Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1988), p. 12.
13. On the Trieste question in 1944–1945, see L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Tretskii vopros v kontse vtoroi
mirovoi voiny (1944–1945),” Slavyanovedenie (Moscow), No. 3 (2001), pp. 3–26; and L. Ya.
Gibianskii, “Tretskii vopros v kontse vtoroi mirovoi voiny (1944–1945),” Slavyanovedenie (Moscow),
No. 4 (2001), pp. 3–30. For background, see Roberto G. Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste, the
United States, and the Cold War, 1941–1954 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988).
14. L. Ya. Gibianskii, “U nachala konºikta—Balkanskii uzel: Otkrytyi arkhiv—K istorii sovetsko-
yugoslavskogo konºikta 1948–1953 gg.,” Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir (Moscow), No. 2 (1990),
p. 173.
15. Tito scaled back his rhetoric in 1942–1943 but only for tactical reasons to allow his initially small
Communist resistance movement to attract other groups and form a mass movement.
16. Initially, Yugoslav writers claimed that Tito’s decision to form a provisional government at Jajce
was taken without consulting Stalin, thus purportedly demonstrating Tito’s willingness to go an inde-
By and large, the Yugoslav Communists intended to build socialism ac-
cording to the Stalinist model. Yugoslavia scrupulously followed the Soviet
model in establishing its economic planning organs, judicial system, state bu-
reaucracy, health care and educational systems, and cultural and educational
spheres. The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 was basically a copy of the Soviet
constitution of 1936.17 To be sure, the leaders of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia (Kommunisticka Partija Jugoslavije—KPJ) were pragmatic enough
to understand that not all aspects of the Soviet model suited Yugoslavia’s par-
ticular circumstances. By the end of 1947, for example, senior KPJ ofªcials
came to believe that collectivization of agriculture in Yugoslavia should follow
a different, less violent path than in the Soviet Union.18 Around the same
time, party leaders also expressed doubts that Soviet educational and cultural
models were the only appropriate solution for Yugoslavia.19
Yugoslav leaders’ views of how to achieve the goal of a socialist (Commu-
nist) society may at times have diverged from those of Soviet leaders, but no
one in Belgrade questioned the goal itself.20 Indeed, the Yugoslav Commu-
nists pursued the “construction of socialism” more fanatically than did their
comrades in the other Eastern European states.21 Even on agricultural policy, a
point strongly criticized by the Soviet side in the letters of accusation in the
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pendent way. More recent Yugoslav publications, however, acknowledge that Tito was in fact in close
contact with Stalin. For example, Nikola Popovib, a specialist on Soviet-Yugoslav relations during
World War II, notes that Tito sent at least four telegrams to Moscow from 1 October to 26 November
1943 laying out in detail his plans to form a government. See Nikola B. Popovib, Jugoslavensko-
sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945) (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu Istoriju, 1988),
p. 312.
17. See L. Ya. Gibianskii, Sovetskii Soyuz i novaya Yugoslaviya 1941–1947 gg. (Moscow: “Nauka,”
1987), pp. 144–146.
18. KPJ leaders decided in late 1947 not to force peasants into Soviet-style collective farms and instead
to form “agricultural cooperatives” that would encompass all peasants. The cooperatives linked the in-
dependent producer to the state, which would then gradually promote rationalization of production.
Only in a later stage would the state force peasants to surrender all their land. See Melissa K. Bokovoy,
Peasants and Communists: Politics and Ideology in the Yugoslav Countryside, 1941–1953 (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 76–78.
19. Carol S. Lilly, Power and Persuasion: Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944–1953
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 137–160.
20. This is best expressed in Tito’s letter of 12 April 1948 to Stalin and Molotov where he responds to
Soviet criticism. Tito makes clear that the KPJ takes the Soviet Union as its example to follow. At the
same time, he writes that in some areas (like the agrarian question) the KPJ has to take into account
the speciªc conditions of Yugoslavia and has to look for the most suitable ways to build socialism.
Tito’s letter was ªrst published in Pisma ZK KPJ i pisma ZK SKP (b) (Belgrade: Kultura,1948), pp. 18–
27.
21. See Leonid Gibianskii, “Ot ‘nerushimoi druzhby’ k besposhchadnoi bor’be: Model’
‘sotsialisticheskogo lagera’ i sovetsko-yugoslavskii konºikt 1948 g.,” in U istokov “sotsialisticheskogo
sodruzhestva:” SSSR i vostochnoevropeiskie strany v 1944–1949 gg.,” (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1995),
pp. 176–208; Wolfgang Höpken, “Die orthodoxe Abweichung: Jugoslawien zum Vergleich,” in Hans
Lemberg et al., eds., Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Prägung: Kontinuität und Wandel in
Ostmitteleuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Marburg und Lahn, Germany: J. G. Herder Institut,
1991), pp. 125–142.
spring of 1948,22 Yugoslavia had moved further toward full collectivization
than the other Eastern European states had. Croatian historian Ivo Banac
points out that by early 1948 “no East European country, except perhaps Bul-
garia, stood closer than Yugoslavia at the threshold of total agricultural collec-
tivization.”23
The KPJ also crushed the opposition more ruthlessly than did the Com-
munist parties in the other Eastern European states.24 Assessing the possibility
of armed resistance against Tito’s regime in mid-February 1946, the Soviet
ambassador in Belgrade, Ivan Sadchikov, reported to Moscow that
according to Milovan Djilas, 200,000 people collaborating with the occupying
forces . . . were liquidated after the liberation of Yugoslavia. . . . According to
[Yugoslav] Minister of Interior, [Aleksandar-Marko] Rankovib, 11,000 members
of armed formations were destroyed, and all the relevant commanders serving
under [Cetnik commander] Draza Mihajlovib were either arrested or shot.25
Sadchikov believed that these ªgures, if anything, were understated, and he
concluded that Tito had a ªrm grip on power and was not threatened domes-
tically.26 A report prepared in August–September 1947 by the foreign policy
commission of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist
Party—which was then formally known as the All-Union Party of Commu-
nists-Bolsheviks, or VKP(b)—noted that all “reactionary and bourgeois
forces” in Yugoslavia had been eliminated and that the “roots of inner and
outer capitalism [in Yugoslavia] had been wiped out more thoroughly than in
the other [East European] states.”27
Because Yugoslavia was the ªrst of the East European countries to estab-
lish a Communist polity, Tito regarded himself as Moscow’s staunchest ally.
His territorial claims on his neighbors were not meant as a challenge to the
Soviet Union. On the contrary, he was acting on the basis of speciªc national
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22. Earlier, in a report “On the International Situation of the Soviet Union,” which was prepared
sometime in August–September 1947 by the foreign policy section of the CC CPSU and served as ba-
sis for Andrei Zhdanov’s speech at the Cominform meeting of September 1947, the KPJ was criticized
for not pursuing a more radical transformation of the agrarian sector. “O mezhdunarodnom
polozhenii Sovetskogo Soyuza,”Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi istorii
(RGASPI), Fond (F.) 575, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 3, List (L.) 104.
23. Banac, With Stalin against Tito, p. 22.
24. G. P. Murashko and A. F. Noskova, “Sovetskii faktor v poslevoennoi Vostochnoi Evrope (1945–
1948),” in L. N. Nezhinskii, ed., Sovetskaya vneshnyaya politika v gody “kholodnoi voiny” (1945–1985):
Novoe prochtenie (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995), p. 87.
25. The report is contained in Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. 06, Op. 7,
Poruchenie (Por.) 867, Papka (P.) 53, L. 9.
26. Ibid.
27. “O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” L. 103.
considerations. The two sides initially were able to resolve all their disagree-
ments, even over such sensitive issues as the dispute with Italy over Trieste.28
Nor did Tito and the other KPJ leaders ever question Moscow’s leader-
ship of the socialist world. Yugoslav ofªcials regarded themselves as devoted
followers of the Soviet Union. Tito continuously declared the Soviet-Yugoslav
alliance the central feature of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, a principle that was
maintained until the breach of 1948. After the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty of
Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed in April 1945, Tito declared
that “the peoples of Yugoslavia have convinced themselves over the past year
that in the great Soviet Union they have found the most honorable ally and
the strongest protector who assists in the development [of Yugoslavia] in
peacetime as well as in war.”29
Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov stressed Yugoslavia’s loyalty in his reports
to Moscow. In mid-December 1945, a few weeks after elections in Yugoslavia
in November had formally brought Tito’s Popular Front (the only party on
the election list) to power, Sadchikov wrote to Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov that “[t]he Yugoslav Popular Front is connecting this vic-
tory . . . with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which is seen as actively
supporting the new Yugoslavia. This conviction is not only prevalent among
the country’s leadership but also among larger circles of the democratic intelli-
gentsia and the people.”30
Thus, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the socialist camp caught not
only Western diplomats and observers by surprise.31 The split was equally
shocking to the leaders of the KPJ and caused great confusion among them in
the months after the split.32 So deep-rooted was the cult of Stalin and the be-
lief in the Soviet model that even after the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the
Cominform, Tito assured the KPJ’s Fifth Congress in July 1948 that the
Yugoslav party’s “unwavering loyalty to the science of Marx-Engels-Lenin-
Stalin [would] prove in practice that [the KPJ] does not deviate from the path
of that science.”33
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28. Leonid Gibianskii, “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conºict and the Cominform,” in
Procacci et al., eds., The Cominform, pp. 468–471.
29. Gibianskii, Sovetskii Soyuz i novaya Yugoslaviya, p. 143.
30. Memorandum from Sadchikov, 18 December 1945, in AVPRF, F. 06, Op. 7, Por. 867, P. 53, L.
49.
31. Although some Western diplomats were aware of strains in Soviet-Yugoslav relations by early June
1948, none anticipated the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. See Beatrice Heuser, West-
ern “Containment” Policies in the Cold War: The Case of Yugoslavia, 1948–53 (London: Routledge,
1989), pp. 35–42.
32. Lilly, Power and Persuasion, p. 162.
33. Vladimir Dedijer, ed., Dokumenti 1948, 3 vols. (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), Vol. 1, p. 376.
Soviet Hegemonic Aspirations and the
Tito-Stalin Split
After World War II, the Soviet Union had every reason to be interested in
good relations with Yugoslavia. For one thing, Yugoslavia served as a model
for the other East European states in their internal development. For another,
Yugoslavia was a staunch ally that shared Moscow’s views of all major interna-
tional issues after the war.34 The journal Bol’shevik, the VKP(b)’s theoretical
organ, showered the KPJ with praise and placed Tito’s name at the top of the
list of the most popular Communist leaders in Eastern Europe.
When the Soviet Union embarked on the forced Sovietization of Eastern
Europe in late 1947 and 1948, Yugoslavia initially embraced the policy.35 At
least until the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, Soviet leaders
presented Yugoslavia as a role model for others to follow. Not until late 1947
did Moscow’s attitude begin to change.
The Cominform was the coordinating organ uniting all European Com-
munist parties including the Italian and French. Although plans existed as
early as 1946 to set up an organization of European Communist parties,36
Stalin did not formally establish the body until after he rejected the Marshall
Plan.37 At the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September 1947,
Andrei Zhdanov, the leader of the Soviet delegation, gave a highly publicized
speech proclaiming the division of the world into two camps: the “imperialis-
tic and anti-democratic” camp led by the United States and the “anti-
imperialistic and democratic” camp led by the Soviet Union.38 This inaugural
meeting signaled that the socialist camp was about to be reorganized, that
Soviet control would be strengthened, and that Stalinist regimes would be im-
posed throughout the region.
Initially, the Yugoslavs enthusiastically supported this endeavor. Zhdanov
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34. For example, although the memorandum compiled by the foreign policy commission of the Soviet
Communist Party in early August 1947 criticized a few aspects of Yugoslav’s revolution, it emphasized
that “[a]mong the countries of the new people’s republics, there is no doubt that Yugoslavia ranks
ªrst.” See “O mezhdunarodnom polozhenii Sovetskogo Soyuza,” L. 3.
35. On the beginning of Sovietization, see also L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Forsirovanie Sovetskoi blokovoi
politiki,” in Kholodnaya voyna 1945–1963: Istoricheskaya retrospektiva (Moscow: “Olma-Press,” 2003),
pp. 137–186, esp. 150–151.
36. Csaba Békés, “Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from
the Hungarian Archives,” Bulletin No. 10, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC,
March 1998, pp. 135–136.
37. L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Kak voznik Kominform: Po novym arkhivnym materialam,” Novaya i
noveishaya istoriya, No. 4 (1993), pp. 131–152; and G. M. Adibekov, Kominform i poslevoennaya
Evropa, 1947–1956 gg. (Moscow: Rossiya molodaya, 1994), pp. 48–103.
38. Zhdanov’s speech at the Cominform meeting is republished in Procacci et al., eds., The
Cominform, pp. 216–251. The text appeared in Pravda (Moscow) on 20 October 1947, p. 1.
in his speech warmly praised Yugoslavia as the East European country that
had moved furthest toward socialism. He urged the other Eastern European
states to follow Yugoslavia’s example. Zhdanov originally had planned to criti-
cize as well as praise the KPJ, but the ªnal version of the speech did not in-
clude any criticism. Early drafts of the speech chastised the Yugoslav and
Czechoslovak Communist parties for certain “errors,” reºecting negative
comments about Yugoslavia in a background report prepared shortly before
the Cominform meeting by the VKP(b)’s foreign policy commission.39 The
commission had been particularly critical of Belgrade’s behavior toward
Trieste and the Balkans.40 No doubt, it was only through Stalin’s intervention
that Zhdanov refrained from bringing up these points.41 As a result, a largely
harmonious atmosphere existed between the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations
at the founding meeting of the Cominform.42
The Cominform was not originally set up to condemn Yugoslavia, as
some Yugoslav writers later claimed.43 Instead, the purpose of the organization
was to tighten Soviet control over all the socialist countries, including Yugo-
slavia. Soviet leaders as of mid-1947 had not yet decided to crack down on
Yugoslavia. The VKP(b)’s foreign policy commission had noted the KPJ’s “er-
rors” in a memorandum on Yugoslavia dated 18 March 1948 (which served as
background for the letter sent by Stalin and Molotov to Yugoslav leaders on
27 March 1948), but the commission was just as critical of the other East Eu-
ropean parties.44 On 5 January 1948, the commission sent two memoranda to
Mikhail Suslov titled “On the Anti-Marxist Ideological Views of the Leaders
of the Polish Communist Party” and “On Certain Errors of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party.”45 In late March 1948, the commission completed another
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memorandum highlighting “errors” of the Hungarian Communist party.46 All
of these reports were issued well before the accusations against the KPJ had
been prepared. From the time the Cominform was created in September
1947 until March 1948, the gradual worsening of relations between Moscow
and Belgrade was by no means unique within the socialist camp. The
Soviet Union was establishing much tighter control over all the East European
states.
The change in Soviet policy was a necessary but not a sufªcient condition
for the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict. Stalin’s decision to single out Yugoslavia was
motivated largely by his displeasure with Tito’s expansionist policy in the
Balkans, particularly toward Albania.
Belgrade’s Ambitions vis-à-vis Albania
Until recently, the role of the Balkans, particularly Albania, in the Soviet-
Yugoslav split was known mostly from Djilas’s Conversations with Stalin. In
1984, a few years after Tito’s death but before the archives were opened, Yugo-
slav historian Vladimir Dedijer included documents in the ªnal installment
of his three-volume biography of Tito that conªrmed the importance of the
Balkans in the Soviet-Yugoslav split. The documents showed, for example,
that in mid-April 1948, Tito told the KPJ Central Committee that “the ªrst
conºict [between Moscow and Belgrade] broke out on account of Albania.”47
Dedijer indicated that the sensitivity of the issue had caused Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Edvard Kardelj in 1953 to prohibit any further reference to this sub-
ject in Tito’s ofªcial biography.48
A key objective of Tito’s policy in the Balkans was to establish Yugoslavia
as the regional hegemon. This goal was evident as early as mid-1943, when
the idea of forming a united headquarters of the partisan movements of Yugo-
slavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece ultimately failed because of Tito’s un-
willingness to agree on a structure giving each member an equal voice. In-
stead, he wanted the organization to be subordinated to the Yugoslav partisan
headquarters. Because Tito believed that his movement was the dominant
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military force in the Balkans, he concluded that “we must be at the center of
the Balkan countries in military as well as political respects.”49
In seeking a dominant role in the region, Yugoslavia hoped to resolve
long-standing ethnic and territorial issues in its favor. Uniªcation with Alba-
nia would have eased Yugoslavia’s concerns about the large ethnic Albanian
minority in Kosovo. Unlike other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, the Kosovar
Albanians largely refused to cooperate with Tito’s Popular Front during World
War II. Although the KPJ maintained close relations with the Communist re-
sistance in Albania during the war, Tito from an early stage was unnerved by
the desire of some members of the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) to
seek uniªcation with Kosovo. When CPA leaders approached the KPJ in mid-
1943 to discuss the prospects of Albania’s postwar uniªcation with Kosovo,
Tito refused to discuss the matter.50 Instead he sought to resolve the Kosovo
question by incorporating Albania into Yugoslavia.51 A similar problem ex-
isted with regard to Macedonia, a historically contested region divided among
Yugoslavia (Vardar Macedonia), Bulgaria (Pirin Macedonia), and Greece
(Aegean Macedonia). Tito wanted to unite all parts of Macedonia within
the framework of an enlarged Yugoslav federation with both Bulgaria and
Greece.52
The southern Balkans thus presented a challenge for Moscow not only
because of the ongoing civil war in Greece, but also because of ethnic and ter-
ritorial disputes that could precipitate a larger conºict. Efforts to stem Yugo-
slav’s growing inºuence in the Balkans became increasingly important at a
time when Stalin sought to tighten control over the whole socialist camp. But
the Yugoslavs were reluctant to forsake their ambitions toward Albania, and
the issue sparked a clash between Moscow and Belgrade in early 1948.53
Tito’s hopes of incorporating Albania into the Yugoslav Federation were
aided by the signing of the Yugoslav-Albanian Treaty on Friendship and Mu-
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tual Assistance in July 1946 and the conclusion of bilateral economic and cus-
toms agreements four months later. These arrangements brought Albania al-
most fully into the Yugoslav economic system. By late 1947, roughly 1,000
Yugoslav specialists were working in Albania on economic development pro-
jects. Yugoslavia played a large role in Albania’s domestic politics as well: The
CPA Central Committee included a representative from the KPJ who had a
formal voice in Tirana’s decision-making and played a key role in the selection
of members of the CPA Politburo.54
Soviet leaders repeatedly indicated that Albania played only a marginal
role in the Soviet bloc and that Moscow would not be opposed if Albania re-
lied more heavily on Belgrade. But Stalin and his aides warned the Yugoslavs
on several occasions not to hasten uniªcation, for fear of inducing Western
powers to protest or even to intervene militarily in Albania.55 In January
1945, Stalin told a Yugoslav delegation headed by Croatian Communist
leader Andrija Hebrang that “the English understand only the language of vi-
olence” and that Yugoslavia should delay ratiªcation of the Treaty on Friend-
ship and Mutual Assistance with Albania in order to avoid international com-
plications.56
Soviet policy on the matter began to change in the latter half of 1947,
when Moscow started to establish direct links with Albania. Until that time,
the Soviet Union had upheld the principle that “the way from Tirana to Mos-
cow leads through Belgrade.”57 In May 1947, for example, before Soviet
ofªcials invited Enver Hoxha, the CPA First Secretary and chairman of the
Albanian Council of Ministers, to Moscow, they ªrst sought consent from
Yugoslav leaders.58 The fact that no CPA representatives were invited to the
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Cominform meeting in September 1947 suggests that Moscow still, for the
most part, regarded Albania as an appendage of Yugoslavia.
At around this time, however, Stalin and Molotov began to have doubts
about Yugoslavia’s policy in the Balkans. Dmitrii Chuvakhin, the Soviet envoy
to Tirana from 1946 to 1952, later recalled that Stalin told the Albanian dele-
gation visiting Moscow in July 1947 that the USSR did not agree with Bel-
grade’s policy toward Albania and that Albania as an independent country
should take care of its foreign relations on its own.59 Stalin’s attitude was con-
sistent with the “information note” on Yugoslavia prepared by the VKP(b)’s
foreign policy commission in August–September 1947, which noted that
Despite the conclusion of a Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance with
Albania, the Yugoslav government has not fulªlled its obligations toward Alba-
nia over an entire year and has not assisted the Albanian Republic economically.
The leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party are very jealous that Albania seeks
direct relations with the Soviet Union. According to the opinion [of the Yugo-
slavs], Albania should have relations with the Soviet Union only via the Yugoslav
government.60
It is not entirely clear from the Soviet documents how Stalin perceived Yugo-
slavia’s policy in the Balkans during this time. Apparently, one key reason for
the growing unease in Moscow was the deterioration of East-West relations
and Yugoslavia’s increasing involvement in the Greek civil war. In the summer
of 1947 Soviet ofªcials learned that Belgrade was about to become militarily
engaged in Greece. The Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Anatolii Lavrent’ev,
warned about the possibility of a war in the Balkans, based on a conversation
he had with Tito on 26 July 1947: “It is absolutely clear that the thought of
striking militarily against Greek provocations is now on Tito’s mind.”61
Tito’s goals vis-à-vis Greece were twofold. First, he hoped that by sup-
porting the Greek Communist guerrillas, half of whom were Slavic-born
Greeks (so-called Greek Macedonians), Yugoslavia could gain territory in the
northern, Slavic-populated areas of (Aegean) Greece. Second, Tito regarded
the war in Greece as a pretext to strengthen Yugoslavia’s presence in Albania,
on the grounds that Yugoslav as well as Albanian borders were threatened by
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provocations from “Greek Monarcho-Fascists.”62 Chuvakhin, the Soviet en-
voy in Albania, later recalled that Tito wanted to exploit the Greek civil war to
move ahead with the annexation of Albania:
Armed provocations on the Greek borders with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugosla-
via intensiªed. The situation in the Balkans could have degenerated into an in-
ternational conºict. In this situation, Yugoslavia was the only friendly country
through which Albania maintained contacts to the outside world. The Belgrade
politicians took advantage of this to foster a closer union between the two coun-
tries, that is, literally to incorporate Albania into Yugoslavia. They [the Yugo-
slavs] created an artiªcial atmosphere of insecurity and fear [in Albania] and
scared the Albanians by telling them they were not in a position to defend them-
selves against the “aggression of the Anglo-Americans and the Greek Monarch-
Fascists.” It has to be said that the Yugoslavs were quite successful at achieving
their goal.63
Not surprisingly, the increased Soviet presence in Albania aroused disquiet in
Belgrade. Yugoslav leaders were especially worried about the inºux of Soviet
specialists into Albania to help out with mining and oil reªning. Yugoslav
ofªcials suspected that the establishment of direct Soviet-Albanian economic
relations would encourage a later political reorientation of Albania.64
These assessments were not far off the mark. Albanian leaders at the time
increasingly viewed the Soviet Union as a bulwark against Yugoslav inºuence.
The question of Albania’s foreign policy orientation was greatly affected by a
power struggle within the Albanian Politburo that revolved essentially around
three people: CPA First Secretary Hoxha, Internal Affairs Minister Koçi Xoxe
(who was also a CPA Secretary and deputy chairman of the Albanian Council
of Ministers), and Economy and Industry Minister Naco Spiru.65
Tensions among these ofªcials increased in November 1947 when Yugo-
slav leaders accused the CPA Politburo of adopting a hostile position toward
Yugoslavia. These accusations were directed principally at Naco Spiru, the
proponent of an anti-Belgrade line. Under the inºuence of Xoxe, Spiru’s
strongest opponent, Hoxha agreed to launch an investigation of Spiru. The
investigation was still under way when Spiru died under mysterious circum-
stances. According to the ofªcial account, Spiru took his own life just a few
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days after the start of the proceedings. His death was politically signiªcant
because he had maintained close contacts with the Soviet mission in Tirana
and regularly heeded the mission’s instructions. Shortly before his death he re-
portedly visited the mission to consult with Soviet ofªcials about his situa-
tion.66
After Spiru’s death, Tito instructed the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow,
Vlado Popovib, to approach Stalin immediately about the Albanian question.
The Yugoslav ambassador met twice, on 4 and 7 December 1947, with Soviet
Politburo-member Andrei Zhdanov. Popovib called Spiru a traitor who in his
anti-Yugoslav activities had made use of “imperialist” methods. The Yugoslav
ambassador emphasized Spiru’s close cooperation with the Soviet mission
in Tirana and thereby indirectly expressed his displeasure at the Soviet pres-
ence in Albania. He emphasized that Albania received all the help it needed
from Yugoslavia. Popovib told Zhdanov that, in light of Spiru’s “suicide,” the
Yugoslav government would be providing “substantial assistance” to the CPA
to purge and consolidate its ranks.67 Popovib’s comments had a clear purpose:
to secure Moscow’s acknowledgment of Albania’s place in the Yugoslav sphere
of inºuence.68
Zhdanov reported the discussion to Stalin, who in turn sent a telegram to
Tito on 23 December 1947 asking him to send to Moscow “a responsible
comrade, for example Djilas or some other person who is familiar with the
situation in Albania.”69 On 17 January 1948, shortly after Djilas arrived in
Moscow, he was summoned to the Kremlin for consultations with the Soviet
dictator. Once again, Stalin expressed support for convergence and the subse-
quent integration of Albania into the Yugoslav Federation. But he added, as a
qualiªcation, that a formal merger of the two countries should be delayed un-
til an appropriate time and format could be worked out. Stalin indicated that
a political merger should be accomplished voluntarily, not against the will of
the Albanians.70
The documents do not clearly indicate which objectives Stalin was really
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pursuing in his statements to Djilas. Was he merely playing for time in order
to clamp down on Yugoslavia’s ambitions toward Albania at some later date?
In any case, what mattered most was how the Yugoslavs perceived Stalin’s po-
sition. Two days after the discussions with Stalin, Djilas sent a telegram to
Belgrade describing the meeting in Moscow and expressing satisfaction with
the results. He showed no sign of doubt about Stalin’s sincerity.71
Yugoslav-Albanian Relations and Moscow’s
Reaction
Tito interpreted Stalin’s statements as approval of Yugoslavia’s policy toward
Albania. Upon receiving Djilas’s report from Moscow, Tito sent Hoxha a tele-
gram suggesting that Albania should allow Yugoslav troops to use military
bases near the south Albanian city of Korcha.72 Tito justiªed this proposal by
alluding to the danger of an incursion by the “the Greek Monarcho-Fascists
with the support of the Anglo-Americans.”73 On 20 January 1948 Hoxha re-
sponded that the Albanian side agreed with Tito’s proposal.74
Although the contacts between Belgrade and Tirana were conducted un-
der maximum secrecy, Soviet ofªcials learned about the events on the same
day. On 21 January, Ambassador Lavrent’ev informed Moscow that the pro-
posed deployment of troops had been agreed without consulting the Soviet
military advisers on the scene.75 Although it remains unclear who passed this
information on to Lavrent’ev, Soviet diplomats in Tirana received informa-
tion about the planned troop movement directly from the Albanian govern-
ment.76
Soviet leaders clearly felt provoked, and their reaction was harsh, in part
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because this was not the only disturbing news from the Balkans in recent
days. A week earlier, on 15 January 1948, the Soviet Politburo received word
that Koçi Xoxe had privately indicated that a merger of the Yugoslav and
Albanian armies was in the works. Xoxe also indicated that Yugoslavia, Bul-
garia, and Albania had already agreed to form a single army under a common
command if the situation demanded it. According to Xoxe, Hoxha had ap-
proved of all these plans.77
On 28 January, Ambassador Lavrent’ev met with Tito at Molotov’s be-
hest to ªnd out whether reports about the proposed troop deployment were
accurate. Lavrent’ev handed a message from Molotov to Tito stating that the
“Anglo-Saxons” regard the “movement of the Yugoslav army into Albania as
an act of occupation of Albania by the Yugoslav army and an infringement of
its sovereignty” and could use these circumstances as a “pretext for interven-
tion in these affairs.”78
After receiving Tito’s response, the ambassador reported back to Molotov
that same day:
In Tito’s opinion the Greek Monarcho-Fascists and their supporters must be
made to understand that Yugoslavia will fully defend Albania. In the event that
[Yugoslavia] does not make this intention demonstrably clear, the Monarcho-
Fascists could easily occupy southern Albania because the Albanian-Greek bor-
der is basically unprotected. Tito further stated that he agrees with Moscow’s
view that we have to reckon with possible actions on the part of the Anglo-
Saxons. It is not impossible that [the movement of Yugoslav troops] will create a
stir in the [Western] press, but this does not concern us. Tito asked for his views
to be passed on to Moscow and decided at the same time to postpone the send-
ing of divisions to Albania for the time being. If the Soviet Union considers it
desirable to abandon this project, Yugoslavia will accept this recommendation.
But if Greece marches into Albania, Tito said in a half-joking tone, “Yugoslavia
together with the Soviet Union will clear this mess up [raskhlebyvat’ etu
kashu].”79
Three days later, Lavrent’ev handed Tito another letter from Molotov that
was phrased in an extremely sharp tone. For the ªrst time, Molotov referred to
“serious differences” between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia:
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From your conversation with comrade Lavrent’ev it is apparent that you consid-
er it normal if Yugoslavia, which has signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with
the USSR, not only believes it can forgo consulting the USSR about the ques-
tion of deploying its army to Albania but does not even consider it necessary at
least to inform [the USSR about such matters]. . . . The Sov[iet] Gov[ernment]
has purely by chance, through personal discussions between Soviet representa-
tives and Albanian ofªcials, become aware of the Yugoslav government’s decision
concerning the deployment of your army to Albania. The USSR does not con-
sider such a procedure to be normal. But if you regard it as normal, then on be-
half of the Soviet government I must inform you that the USSR cannot agree to
being presented with a fait accompli. It goes without saying that the USSR as an
ally of Yugoslavia is not prepared to accept responsibility for the potential conse-
quences of such conduct.80
Lavrent’ev reported back to Moscow that after reading the missive, Tito be-
came very uneasy. According to the ambassador, Tito conceded that it was a
serious error to make the decision without consulting Moscow. Lavrent’ev
said that the Yugoslav leader promised not to move the Yugoslav divisions to
Albania and to consult with Moscow in advance about all such matters in the
future.81
The Soviet authorities were not content with a simple apology from Tito.
On 1 February 1948 Lavrent’ev handed the Yugoslav marshal a further letter
from Molotov emphasizing that
serious differences exist between us with regard to questions of foreign policy. In
view of the tense international situation we believe it necessary to eliminate
these differences by means of an exchange of views at an unofªcial meeting in
Moscow. We therefore request that you send two or three senior ofªcials of the
Yugoslav government to Moscow for an exchange of views. Ofªcials of the Bul-
garian government have also been invited. Time of arrival not later than 8–10
February. Inform us of your view.82
Tito immediately accepted the invitation and sent a high-ranking Yugoslav
delegation to the Soviet capital. On 8 February, in line with the timetable,
Edvard Kardelj, the “second man” in the Yugoslav leadership after Tito, along
with another senior Yugoslav ofªcial, Vladimir Bakarib, arrived in Moscow.
Djilas was already there awaiting them and joined the Yugoslav delegation.
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The Soviet “letter of invitation” indicates that a Bulgarian delegation was
also summoned to Moscow. This was in response to a controversial statement
by the Bulgarian Communist Party leader Georgi Dimitrov.83 Speaking to
Western journalists on 17 January 1948, Dimitrov referred to the merger of
East European states and the eventual uniªcation of the “people’s democra-
cies” into a single federally organized state. He stated that “when the time is
ripe [for a federation or confederation]—and it is turning ripe now—. . . our
people, the people of the people’s democracies, that is, Romania, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece (please
note, Greece as well!), will solve this question.”84
Dimitrov’s mention of Greece as a “people’s democracy” aroused great
international attention. To be sure, the ªrst negative reaction from the side of
the socialist camp came not from Moscow but from Belgrade. Tito argued
that Dimitrov’s speech was “damaging” and asked Djilas to suggest that Stalin
“have a word with the Bulgarian comrades.” The Yugoslav leader wanted
to emphasize that Dimitrov’s position could not be equated with that of
Belgrade, particularly regarding Greece.85
The Soviet newspaper Pravda mentioned the issue on 23 January 1948
but refrained from criticizing Dimitrov. Two days later, however, Stalin sent
Dimitrov a telegram describing the statement as a “rash and damaging” com-
ment that facilitated the “struggle of the Anglo-Americans against . . . the peo-
ple’s democracies.”86 On 28 January, Pravda again mentioned Dimitrov’s
statement but this time subjected it to severe criticism. The following day, the
Bulgarian government announced through its press agency that it totally ac-
cepted the Soviet position. On 2 February Dimitrov publicly disavowed his
statement and wrote to Stalin assuring him of his solidarity with the Soviet
position.87
The Soviet Union’s sudden change of policy vis-à-vis Dimitrov’s state-
ment had relatively little to do with the statement per se. When Djilas met
with Zhdanov on 19 January 1948 to clarify the Yugoslav position on
Dimitrov’s statement, Zhdanov did not indicate whether Moscow would ex-
ert inºuence on Bulgaria, and he also refrained from commenting on
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Dimitrov’s statement.88 The turnaround in Soviet policy apparently came
when Soviet leaders learned about Tito’s intention to send two Yugoslav divi-
sions to Albania. Thus, it was not Dimitrov’s statement as such but the gen-
eral direction of Yugoslav policy in the Balkans (and particularly the plans to
send troops to Albania) that prompted the Soviet rebuke of Dimitrov.
Path to Confrontation: The Meeting of 10 February
1948 and Its Aftermath
On 10 February 1948, Bulgarian and Yugoslav ofªcials met in Moscow with
Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov, and other high-ranking Soviet ofªcials (Georgii
Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin).
The Soviet participants voiced severe criticism of Bulgarian and Yugoslav ac-
tions.89 The ªrst point raised by Molotov was the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty
on Friendship and Mutual Assistance, which had been signed in Bled on
1 August 1947 without prior consultation with Moscow. The lack of consul-
tation about this matter, Molotov argued, reºected “serious differences”
between Moscow and the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments.90
The main accusation was lodged against Yugoslavia for its plan to send
two divisions to Albania. At Stalin’s request, Molotov read the passage from
Lavrent’ev’s telegram of 28 January 1948 referring to the need for the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia to “sort out the mess” together in case of an Anglo-
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American intervention.91 When Kardelj tried to justify the Yugoslav position
by citing the military threat to southern Albania from the Greek government,
Molotov replied that Moscow had no information about this matter. Stalin
clearly believed that Yugoslavia’s regional ambitions vis-à-vis Albania were
what had spurred the decision. “Half-jokingly,” the Soviet dictator said that
“the Yugoslavs [were afraid of ] the Russians in Albania and so were hurrying
to move their army there.”92
Stalin repeatedly broached the subject of the civil war in Greece. To the
surprise of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders, Stalin insisted that the Greek
Communists “must be helped if there is a chance of achieving victory, and if
that is not the case, consideration should be given to disbanding the partisan
movement.” When Kardelj suggested that the Greek partisans could win, Sta-
lin declared that the Soviet leadership “has in recent times had grave doubts
about this” and “does not believe that things are developing as well in Greece
as in China.”93 Both Djilas and Kardelj note in their memoirs that at the
10 February meeting, Stalin explicitly demanded an end to the Greek rebel-
lion.94 Stalin also was signaling to the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders that they
should suspend all assistance to the Greek Communists. This was particularly
relevant to Yugoslavia, which played a key role in the Greek civil war. The sur-
vival of the Greek partisans depended substantially on the scale of Yugoslav
support.95
Stalin and Molotov argued that Yugoslav and Bulgarian actions in Greece
could have led to dangerous international complications. Although none of
the actions cited by Moscow, not even the advance of Yugoslav troops into
Albania, directly conjured up the danger of war—and thereby of possible in-
ternational involvement—maneuvering over the Greek civil war did have the
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potential to spark a major international crisis. Soviet leaders sensed that vic-
tory for the Greek Communists could be achieved only through direct mili-
tary intervention, which would risk a confrontation with the Western powers
that were already preparing a formal military alliance. Stalin did not want to
aggravate international tensions for a futile cause.96 He was aware that the
West regarded the Greek civil war as an indicator of Soviet expansionist
plans.97
Nonetheless, although fear of international escalation was certainly im-
portant, it was hardly the only reason for Stalin’s shift on the Greek uprising.
When a crisis arose in Czechoslovakia later that month, Stalin was ready to
help the Czechoslovak Communists come to power with more than just dip-
lomatic means, if necessary.98 Similarly, when growing tensions over Berlin in
the ªrst several months of 1948 escalated into a full-blown crisis in the sum-
mer, the Soviet Union came close to fomenting a confrontation with the
West.99
The documents currently available in Moscow do not fully clarify Stalin’s
position on the issue of Greece. Leonid Gibianskii argues that
the basis for Soviet condemnation of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian initiatives was,
in the ªnal analysis, [Stalin’s] dissatisfaction with the independence of the ac-
tions themselves . . . although it is entirely possible that at the same time the
Kremlin was genuinely apprehensive of possible Western reactions to these
moves.100
This is in line with the explanation offered by Djilas:
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Not even today am I clear on Stalin’s motives in condemning the uprising in
Greece. Perhaps he thought that to create still another Communist state—
Greece—in the Balkans, when not even the others were reliable and subservient,
could hardly have been in his interest, to say nothing of possible international
complications, which were becoming more and more threatening and even if
they did not drag him into war, they might endanger positions he already had
won.101
Toward the end of the meeting, Stalin condemned Dimitrov’s statement
of 17 January but then unexpectedly proposed the creation of three smaller
federations in Eastern Europe.102 Speciªcally, he supported a union of Roma-
nia and Hungary, a union of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and a union of three
Balkan states—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.103 As a ªrst step, Stalin or-
dered the immediate merger of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Only at a later date
would Albania join the Balkan federation.104 Clearly, Stalin’s intention in
shifting the focus to Bulgaria was to disrupt Yugoslavia’s efforts to incorporate
Albania. Tito was no longer as gung-ho about a union with Bulgaria as he had
been right after the war.105
The Yugoslav and Bulgarian participants were contrite during the
10 February meeting. They acknowledged having made “mistakes” and hav-
ing violated procedures. The day after the meeting, Kardelj and Dimitrov
signed a Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty drawn up by Moscow that committed Bul-
garia and Yugoslavia to consult with the Soviet Union on all relevant interna-
tional matters.106
The meeting in Moscow represented an ultimatum regarding intra-bloc
procedures on foreign policy. Shortly after the Moscow meeting, on 19 Febru-
ary, the KPJ Politburo met secretly to discuss the Moscow talks.107 The partic-
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ipants unanimously agreed that Yugoslavia should not form a federation with
Bulgaria.108 This was the ªrst time that Tito had refused to obey a direct, un-
ambiguous order from Moscow.
Two days later, Yugoslav leaders disregarded yet another Soviet request.
Tito, Kardelj, and Djilas met with high-ranking Greek Communist ofªcials,
including the General Secretary, Nikos Zakhariádes, and informed them that
Stalin had spoken in favor of ending the Greek civil war. Tito, however, prom-
ised to continue to support the Greek “war of liberation” with military aid.109
To be sure, the situation along the Yugoslav-Greek border had become
acute by this point. In a discussion with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Stanoje
Simib on 10 March 1948, Lavrent’ev learned that the entire Yugoslav air force
had been put on a war footing. According to Simib, the Yugoslav General
Command made this decision to thwart expected “military provocations from
the Greek Monarcho-Fascists.”110 Shortly after speaking with Simib,
Lavrent’ev approached Tito about the situation in Greece:
I asked Tito what news there was from Greece. Tito limited his answer to the
statement that the Democratic Greek Army had achieved a major victory in
Epirus over the forces of the Greek Monarchists. Tito said nothing to me about
the matter that Simib brought up with me today—that Yugoslavia’s General
Command had taken appropriate measures in case of military provocation from
the Greek Monarchists.111
To Moscow’s irritation, Yugoslavia also still planned to send troops to
Albania. But because of the tension in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Tito wanted
the Albanians to press for the dispatch of two Yugoslav divisions. At Tito’s be-
hest, the Albanians sought to persuade Moscow of the need for Yugoslav
forces in Albania. Likewise, the Albanians “at their own initiative” were sup-
posed to urge Stalin to approve of the merger of Albania and Yugoslavia.112
The extent of Yugoslav pressure on the Albanian side during this time is
evident from the text of a resolution adopted by the CPA Central Committee
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at a plenum on 26 February–8 March 1948. The resolution discussed Yugo-
slav-Albanian relations at length, focusing mostly on the internal situation
and self-criticism of the party. The resolution denounced “certain elements”
that together with the late Naco Spiru had spoken against a merger with
Yugoslavia. The resolution also declared that a pro-Yugoslav orientation was
Albania’s ofªcial foreign policy line.113
Subsequently, the Albanian authorities adopted a secret document re-
garding the planned “merger of the Albanian army with the Yugoslavian.”
The document highlighted the various components of the Albanian army that
would be reorganized to facilitate a merger. The justiªcation for this move
was laid out in the introductory preamble, which stressed the danger of a
Greek invasion of southern Albania and claimed that the deployment of
Yugoslav troops to fortify the borders was “urgently necessary.”114
At a further meeting of the KPJ Politburo on 1 March, the participants
reafªrmed their position. For the ªrst time, senior Yugoslav ofªcials openly
complained that Soviet leaders were taking no account of Yugoslavia’s interests
and were trying to impose unwise measures on Yugoslavia. The KPJ Politburo
also accused Moscow of willfully torpedoing Soviet-Yugoslav economic and
military-industrial cooperation and passed a resolution calling for a more in-
dependent course in these areas.115
Stalin and his associates were kept closely apprised of the situation in
Yugoslavia. The most important source of information was Sreten Zujovib, a
KPJ Politburo member and minister in the Yugoslav government, who in-
formed Soviet ofªcials about the KPJ Politburo’s 1 March meeting (he did not
attend the meeting on 19 February).116 Reports from the Soviet embassy in
Belgrade also contributed to the increase in Soviet-Yugoslav tension. From
March 1946 (when Sadchikov was replaced by Lavrent’ev as Soviet ambassa-
dor), these reports took on an increasingly negative tone. Lavrent’ev spoke
harshly about Yugoslav actions and highlighted the shortcomings of individ-
ual Yugoslav leaders. The reports frequently condemned the “national nar-
row-mindedness” of Yugoslav ofªcials and their insistence on downplaying
the role of the Soviet Union.117
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Open Conflict
In the spring of 1948 the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict became a more overtly
ideological confrontation. On 18 March 1948 the USSR withdrew its mili-
tary advisers from Yugoslavia. On 27 March Stalin and Molotov sent their
famous ªrst letter to the Yugoslav leaders, accusing them of an anti-Soviet and
anti-Marxist-Leninist position.118 When Tito rejected Moscow’s accusations,
Stalin and Molotov sent a copy of the letter in late April 1948 to the other
Eastern European leaders. This was the ªrst step toward uniting the socialist
camp against Yugoslavia and preparing for the ofªcial Cominform condem-
nation in June. Signiªcantly, Stalin and Molotov in their exchanges with Tito
from March to May 1948 almost totally refrained from criticizing Yugoslav
policy in the Balkans. Evidently they wanted to avoid the impression that this
was just an argument about power politics.
Why did Tito refuse to acknowledge his “errors” after the start of the
Soviet ideological campaign in March 1948? Clearly, it was not in Tito’s inter-
est to provoke this kind of conºict. His claim to build socialism and rule
Yugoslavia rested on a close alliance with the Soviet Union. But after the ªerce
ideological confrontation began in March 1948, Tito was essentially con-
fronted with choosing the lesser of two evils: to surrender or to resist Stalin.
Tito had no illusions that “confessing” to the harsh Soviet accusations would
mean only his total submission. As one of the few Yugoslav Communists in
the Soviet Union who survived the Stalinist purges in the late 1930s (some
800 of his comrades were killed), he also knew that giving in not only would
end his political career, but might also cost him his life.119
Resisting the Soviet Union after the break entailed two great risks. The
ªrst was the prospect of Soviet military intervention. Because Soviet military
planning documents on this matter are still inaccessible, it is impossible to say
for sure whether Stalin ever seriously considered a direct military invasion of
Yugoslavia.120 The documentary evidence that is available from East European
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and Western countries strongly suggests that, at least through late 1950, Sta-
lin did not prepare for military intervention in Yugoslavia. What his inten-
tions were in the ªnal two years of his life is less clear, but regardless of his pre-
cise aims, the fact is that the Yugoslavs from the outset greatly feared such a
scenario.121 As rumors of an imminent Soviet attack spread from mid-1948
on, the Yugoslav authorities tried to plan for war with the Soviet Union and
its allies.122 The second risk facing Tito was an internal move against him. He
knew that his decision to resist would likely stir up considerable opposition
within the KPJ, which included many true Stalinist believers. Ivo Banac sug-
gests that up to 20 percent of party members sided with Stalin rather than
Tito after the split. Tito and his colleagues responded with a massive cam-
paign against real or imagined “Cominformists” (also called ibeovci), thou-
sands of whom were imprisoned, killed, or forced into exile. Prominent vic-
tims included Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovib.123
The single most important reason for Tito to resist Stalin was, however,
the nature of his power base. Of all the Communist leaders in Eastern
Europe, Tito and Hoxha were the only ones who played a large role in the lib-
eration of their countries from wartime occupation. At the end of the war,
Tito’s partisan guerrillas numbered roughly 200,000. Unlike other resistance
movements in Yugoslavia, Tito’s forces included ªghters from all the major
Yugoslav nationalities. The fact that Tito came to power supported by a mass
movement must have contributed to his self-conªdence and given him the
sense that he could defend his position against “internal enemies” or even
against an outside attack.124
What was Stalin’s larger calculus behind the condemnation of Yugoslavia?
The role of the Cominform is important in this regard. Whereas the inaugu-
ral meeting of the Cominform in September 1947 was intended to speed up
the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, the meeting that condemned Yugoslavia
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in late June 1948 was intended to demonstrate to all the Communist leaders
that the rules of the game had changed. The accusations lodged against Yugo-
slavia signaled Stalin’s new organizational program for the socialist camp.125
Illustrative in this respect is the letter of 4 May 1948 from Stalin and Molotov
to KPJ leaders afªrming the Soviet Union’s right to interfere in the East Euro-
pean states’ internal affairs.126 Previously, the system allowed a modicum
of ºexibility and left a bit of leeway for individual states, but starting in 1948
the slightest deviation was tantamount to disobedience and was therefore
forbidden.
No document has yet emerged from the archives that conclusively illumi-
nates Stalin’s own role in the conºict and his personal attitude toward the
KPJ. The most useful source currently available on this matter is a report sent
by Stalin to the Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald on 14 July 1948, just
two weeks after the Cominform meeting:
I have the impression that you [Gottwald] are counting on the defeat of Tito
and his group at the next congress of the KPJ. You suggest publishing compro-
mising material against the Yugoslav leaders. . . . We in Moscow are not count-
ing on the early defeat of Tito and have never counted on it.
We have achieved the isolation of Yugoslavia. Hence, the gradual decline of
Tito’s Marxist groups is to be expected. This will require patience and the ability
to wait. You seem to be lacking in patience. . . . There can be no doubt that
Marxism will triumph in due course.127
The document suggests that Stalin’s primary aim was not to topple Tito but
to isolate Yugoslavia. It casts doubt on Nikita Khrushchev’s claim about Sta-
lin’s supposed conªdence that Tito would be quickly removed. Khrushchev in
his secret speech to the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in 1956 insisted that
when the conºict with Tito erupted Stalin had declared, “I will shake my little
ªnger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall.”128 Even if Stalin initially
(i.e., before the Cominform resolution) believed that Tito, like other promi-
nent East European Communists, could not withstand Soviet pressure (there
are, however, no archival sources to sustain this view), the letter to Gottwald
shows that Stalin clearly did not expect Tito’s rapid ouster after the
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Cominform adopted its resolution.129 Most likely, the statement quoted by
Khrushchev is spurious.
Why was Stalin in no hurry to bring Yugoslavia under full Soviet control?
Part of this has to do with his view of the Balkans after World War II. At the
beginning of the war the Soviet Union regarded Yugoslavia and Greece to be
outside its sphere of immediate interest. Molotov had made this clear in Au-
gust 1939 when he negotiated the Nazi-Soviet pact with the Germans.130
Soviet attitudes changed during the war when it became clear that the tide
was shifting in Moscow’s favor. A high-ranking Soviet Foreign Commissariat
ofªcial, Ivan Maiskii, claimed in October 1943 that the whole of the Balkans
had been assigned to the Soviet sphere of inºuence.131 Later Soviet statements
and documents suggest a more ºexible Soviet position. A report by Deputy
Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov in February 1945 proposed seeking a
compromise with the West over Yugoslavia—a view that seems to have
reºected Stalin’s own position.132 The secret “percentages deal” concluded by
Stalin and Winston Churchill on 9 October 1944 stipulated that each side
would be given a “50-percent share” of inºuence in Yugoslavia.133
This allocation worked decidedly in favor of the Soviet Union. The coun-
try fell under Soviet inºuence not because of any grand strategic design but
because of events on the ground. The Red Army marched into Belgrade in
1944, but Tito’s own forces had already freed the rest of the country by then,
and the partisans reached Belgrade at basically the same time that Soviet
troops did. For the USSR this situation was advantageous as long as it was
controllable. But when Stalin sensed that Tito was pursuing a separate, ambi-
tious agenda in the Balkans, he decided to get rid of the Yugoslav leader—
maybe even at the risk of losing the country altogether.
Most likely, Stalin believed that what he actually gained from the conºict
was, at least in the short run, worth the cost of losing Yugoslavia. Stalin’s strat-
egy to isolate Yugoslavia strengthened Moscow’s grip over the rest of the so-
cialist camp. As noted above, the Soviet Union was preparing in early 1948 to
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attack Communist leaders in Poland and Czechoslovakia. By orchestrating
the Cominform’s condemnation of the KPJ, Stalin created both a pretext and
a precedent for the subsequent purges of Communist parties in the other East
European countries. A series of accusations followed against high-ranking
Communists, who were denounced as “Titoists.” Among these were
Wladyslaw Gomulka in Poland, János Kádár in Hungary, and Gustáv Husák
in Czechoslovakia. The many who were executed for allegedly pro-Titoist ten-
dencies (often following show trials and “confessions”) included Koçi Xoxe in
Albania, László Rajk in Hungary, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, and Rudolf
Slánskü in Czechoslovakia.
The split with Belgrade also helped Moscow to achieve a number of im-
portant objectives in the Balkans. Albania turned completely away from Bel-
grade and found its new patron in Moscow. Bulgaria became one of the stron-
gest critics of Tito and closest allies of Moscow. Finally, Yugoslavia ended its
assistance to the Greek Communist guerrillas a few months after the Comin-
form resolution and thereby contributed to the defeat of the Communists in
the Greek civil war.
Conclusion
The former Soviet archives have not yielded sensational new evidence that
would force a complete revision of the history of the Soviet-Yugoslav split.
Rather, the Soviet documents make clear which events were particularly im-
portant and how they became entangled with the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict. In
particular, the new evidence permits a much more detailed understanding of
the signiªcance of Yugoslavia’s policy in the Balkans, showing how Tito’s at-
tempts to integrate Albania into Yugoslavia ran afoul of Stalin’s Sovietization
plans for Eastern Europe.
The newly available documents do not deªnitively settle the question of
whether a confrontation between Tito and Stalin was inevitable. Contrary to
a widespread view in the earlier literature, the latest evidence from the Russian
archives does not support the thesis that the two sides were destined to clash
because of differing views about the establishment of socialism. Moreover,
although the hardening of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe was a neces-
sary condition for the Soviet-Yugoslav split, it was not a sufªcient condition.
Not until March 1948, when Yugoslav leaders decided that they would not
accept Moscow’s demands—and the Soviet Union in turn embarked on an
ideologically charged attack—did a confrontation become unavoidable.
Thus, the process of region-wide Sovietization and the Soviet-Yugoslav
conºict did not become directly intertwined until the spring of 1948. Soviet
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leaders came to see the maintenance of Albanian independence as a prerequi-
site for limiting Yugoslavia’s inºuence in the Balkans.
The declassiªcation of Soviet and East European documents has greatly
illuminated previously obscure events in the complicated triangle involving
Moscow, Belgrade, and Tirana. Nonetheless, important gaps in our knowl-
edge remain. Soviet strategic thinking and policies vis-à-vis the southern
Balkan region have thus far attracted relatively little attention among scholars
of the Cold War. Soviet perceptions of the Greek civil war, of the federation
plans among the Balkan states, and of relations with Albania have gone largely
unexplored. Given the salience of Albania in the Soviet-Yugoslav conºict, a
thorough scholarly analysis of Soviet policy toward this small Balkan state will
be a key task for future research.
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